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Abstract 
 
Firms in the sharing economy typically offer higher 
flexibility but lower security of working conditions. In 
response to challenges from suppliers and policy 
makers, several platform companies are reconsidering 
their approach. This study examines the effects of 
offering sharing economy suppliers a menu of contract 
options, differentiated by varying levels of flexibility, 
security, and information transparency on their 
willingness to work for a platform. We focus on 
ridesharing, one of the largest sectors in the sharing 
economy, but the insights translate to other segments 
of this emerging sector. Using a discrete choice 
experiment, we find drivers’ willingness to work for 
ridesharing generally increases when the platform 
offers diversified combinations of flexibility, security, 
and transparency. We also find evidence that 
suppliers’ preferences to participate in the sharing 
economy are influenced by the working conditions in 
their alternative employment options.   
 
1. Introduction  
 
Innovative platform businesses are transforming the 
nature of employment relations and the working 
conditions of suppliers. Often referred to as the 
“sharing economy,” this emerging class of activities 
comprises a broad range of services that are based on 
shared access to assets (e.g., apartments, cars), skills 
(e.g., consulting, crafts, driving), or both (e.g., 
ridesharing) [17]. These platforms serve as a digital 
intermediary between suppliers (e.g., Uber drivers, 
Airbnb hosts) and consumers (e.g., Uber passengers, 
Airbnb guests). To maintain a sustainable platform 
business, managers must design user-friendly ICT 
interfaces and develop a critical mass of supply and 
demand on the platform [43]. But with increasing 
competition and regulations in the space, building a 
sustainable, profitable platform business is a challenge.  
The platform economy typically provides higher 
flexibility for suppliers, but it offers lower security 
than standard employment. Platform owners typically 
treat suppliers as independent contractors rather than as 
employees. Using court and legal challenges as well as 
strikes, Uber and Lyft drivers have protested to 
demand better job security. Legal measures to improve 
the standing of drivers have been adopted in several 
states and countries and more are pending. Given these 
and other challenges, platforms have yet to generate 
profits. 
One of the challenges in the sharing economy is to 
secure the level and diversity of supply of services 
demanded by consumers. Understanding the 
motivations and deterrents of suppliers is essential to 
attract them and to scale the operation. There is 
evidence that the value placed on the flexibility of 
where and when to work [21], lower entry barriers for 
suppliers than in traditional labor markets, and the 
improved ability to monetize skills and resources are 
the main reasons for the fast influx of participants into 
the sharing economy. However, irregular work, fast 
changing business structures, and incomplete 
legislation may create uncertainty as to the 
sustainability of income and the longevity of jobs. 
These factors may reduce the willingness of suppliers 
to offer their service in a platform. 
To secure participation by the required number of 
suppliers, firms must develop governance models that 
balance these competing factors. This requires a good 
understanding of suppliers’ heterogeneous preferences 
for flexibility and security to efficiently minimize 
conflicts, reduce negotiation costs, and eventually 
grow and sustain service supply. While there has been 
substantial attention on adoption of sharing economy 
services by consumers, the role of flexibility and 
security for suppliers of services in the platform 
economy has received only limited attention in prior 
research.  
In addition to flexibility and security, we 
investigate unique information features that are 
exclusively available in digital platforms. Since a 
platform is a marketplace where suppliers make work 
decisions, design of transparency strategies may 
influence the willingness of suppliers to work with the 
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platform. While prior studies on transparency in IS 
have primarily focused on B2B [49] or B2C [19, 20] 
relationships, the effect of participants’ information 
transparency in P2P markets has not been fully 
examined. To reduce these gaps, our study aims to 
answer the following research questions:  
1) How do flexibility and security of working 
conditions affect the willingness of suppliers to work 
with a sharing economy platform?  
2)  How do information features that are available 
only on a digital platform affect the willingness of 
suppliers to work with the platform?   
This study focuses on ridesharing services, one of 
the largest segments of the sharing economy. Using 
discrete choice experiments, we examine factors 
related to the information features of the platform and 
the design of the work conditions, particularly the 
balance of flexibility and security on the decision to 
work. Moreover, we explore the relationship between 
the decision to offer services in a platform and the 
flexibility and security of alternate job options. This 
study expands extant research on the sharing economy 
and on platform governance. It also contributes to one 
perspective in labor economics that asserts a positive 
relationship between flexibility and security (referred 
to as “flexicurity”). To our best knowledge, this is a 
first study investigating the effects of offering different 
levels of flexibility and security on the willingness to 
supply services in a platform. The findings shed light 
for platform businesses in general, including space 
rental, food delivery, and errand services platforms.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
The next section reviews relevant studies on platform 
governance, information transparency, and flexicurity 
to then develop key testable hypotheses. We then 
describe the data and research design, and report 
results. The concluding section discusses contributions 
and suggests future directions for research.   
 
2. Institutional and theoretical foundations 
 
2.1. Platform governance in the sharing 
economy  
 
The IS field uses the term “platform” in multiple 
research contexts. Accordingly, several concepts of 
“platform governance” have been proposed (e.g., [11, 
18]). Summarizing common traits of platform 
governance described in the prior literature [29], 
platform governance is “a multi-dimensional concept” 
controlling dynamically managed decision-making 
processes in a platform ecosystem [7, 38, 45], by using 
a structure, power, processes, and mechanisms [45]. 
Tiwana [44] implies that the purpose of platforms is 
to organize and coordinate wealth creation. Parker, 
Van Alstyne, and Choudary [35] clarify that the 
purpose of good platform governance is “to create 
wealth, fairly distributed among all those who add 
value.” To achieve such fairness, platform owners must 
resolve conflicts among stakeholders of the platform 
community. As conflicts to distribute the newly created 
wealth may aggravate undesirable digital inequality 
[13, 22], the importance of good governance has 
become an important focus. 
While there exists substantial research on 
governance of a platform’s owner-developer 
relationship [10, 39, 45] and owner-consumer 
relationship [24, 37], the owner-supplier relationship 
has not been investigated in comparable detail [29]. 
Prior studies of platform businesses have examined 
laws [31], norms [16], architecture [36], and pricing [4, 
47, 48] as means of platform governance [35]. 
Recently, contracts governing relations among 
participants in the platform ecosystem have received 
increasing (but still limited) attention [10, 30]. 
Conceptually, this study analyzes contracts as a tool of 
platform governance that may be employed to manage 
conflicts and reconcile tensions between platform 
owners and suppliers, in line with ideas suggested by 
platform cooperativism [41].   
In the case of ridesharing services, platform owners 
delegate to suppliers the decision on when and where 
to work. In turn, suppliers delegate to the platform 
owner the decision on whom they provide their service 
to or the access to a resource, as well as the payment 
amount. This attribution of decision making creates 
potentially difficult incentive problems. In the 
prevailing competitive work environment, sharing 
economy suppliers may need to accept lower 
compensation [32] and lower protection [15] than 
traditional jobs. As a result, suppliers may be relatively 
worse off, and in the long term, economic disparity 
may deepen [8, 42]. Thus, the role of working 
conditions as a key factor to influence suppliers’ utility 
and to attract and retain them in a platform remains an 
important issue to be researched. 
 
2.2. Information transparency and platform 
design  
 
Managing information transparency has become 
easier as ICT advances. Firms may utilize transparency 
strategies when designing a digital platform to draw 
more suppliers and consumers. The transparency 
strategy includes not only revealing but also concealing 
information to participants.   
Prior studies in IS have mainly investigated B2B or 
B2C markets [12, 20, 49]. In B2B and B2C markets, 
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information of products, prices, inventory, cost, or 
process is typically disclosed by suppliers or firms to 
consumers or competitors [20]. In P2P sharing 
economy markets, suppliers also want to receive 
information about consumers because there is a risk 
involved in sharing access to their properties. Thus, 
platform owners disclose consumer information to 
reduce information asymmetry and establish trust of 
the digital marketplace [40].   
In the sharing economy, platform owners have to 
handle participants’ concerns about misuse of private 
information which can be exposed as they receive or 
provide services [2]. In particular, firms may conceal 
certain information to relieve suppliers’ privacy 
concerns. The key is to provide an effective means of 
communication between suppliers and consumers that 
creates a trustworthy environment that suppliers and 
consumers perceive as efficient and safe to transact.  
 
2.3. Labor supply and flexicurity  
 
Many suppliers in the sharing economy hold other 
jobs. Thus, in addition to the role of flexibility and 
security in the sharing economy, a potential interaction 
exists with these other jobs. In traditional labor 
economics, individual labor supply is the outcome of 
two interrelated decisions: whether to work at all, and, 
if so, for how long. The opportunity cost of leisure, 
wealth, and preferences are usually regarded as the 
most important components in decisions to work [14]. 
The wage rate is considered the opportunity cost of one 
hour of leisure, and total income is often a proxy for 
total wealth [14]. Workers’ preferences for other 
aspects like types of industry, flexibility of work hours, 
and benefit plans may vary depending on individual 
demographic factors such as age, educational 
attainment, and household income.  
Job flexibility and security have long been studied 
as major institutional aspects influencing a decision to 
work. There are two different perspectives on the 
relationship between job flexibility and security: the 
trade-off theory and the flexicurity hypothesis, initially 
proposed in the context of labor reforms in the 
Netherlands and Denmark in the late 1990s [6, 32]. 
The first view posits that a negative relationship exists 
between the degree of flexibility and security. In other 
words, a higher level of flexibility can only be reached 
by reducing the degree of job security. The flexicurity 
hypothesis sees the relationship between flexibility and 
security as positive [28]. For example, a generous 
income security policy motivates risk averse workers 
to more proactively change jobs, contributing to 
flexibility in the labor market.1   
Whereas much of the flexicurity discussion focuses 
on employment flexibility and income security at the 
labor market-level, this study utilizes the concept to 
investigate individual-level interactions. As many 
suppliers hold other jobs, we explore how the 
flexibility and security of an individual’s job outside 
the sharing economy relates to activities in the sharing 
economy. For example, if a sharing economy platform 
structures contracts so a supplier can make choices to 
balance work flexibility and security, it may 
compensate for the lack of flexibility or security in the 
supplier’s main alternative job. In this way, the sharing 
economy job may increase the overall perceived 
flexibility and security, so the supplier does not have to 
relinquish one of the two. 
 
 
3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
development  
 
Starting from gaps in research on the sharing 
economy, platform governance, and the flexicurity 
thesis, we examine ridesharing suppliers’ preferences 
for different combinations of labor contract conditions 
using an online choice experiment. Figure 1 depicts the 
set of questions explored in this study. 
The hypothetical contract conditions, which may 
influence perceived flexibility and security and 
eventually affect suppliers’ willingness to work, were 
identified through a multi-pronged approach, including 
a review of the literature on job satisfaction (e.g., [1, 3, 
5]), recent public discussions regarding ridesharing 
(e.g., [9, 50]), six interviews, and 47 surveys of 
ridesharing suppliers and a ridesharing expert. 
Considering that the capacity of the human brain to 
compare permutations of choice options with multiple 
attributes is limited, only the seven most salient 
attributes were included in the choice sets. A set of 
attributes is composed of both contractual and 
information transparency design dimensions of 
ridesharing services. Contractual conditions include 
options that are currently not offered by ridesharing 
services. To obtain an estimate of drivers’ perceived 
value of information transparency, we also include 
important information features of ridesharing apps that 
would not be readily available if a supplier chose 
another platform.  
                                                
1  Although there are a variety of opinions concerning the most 
effective components and formula of the flexicurity concept 
depending on countries and economic circumstances, the core notion 
is the complementarity of flexibility (e.g., employment flexibility) 
and security (e.g., income security). 
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Figure 1. Framework and hypotheses  
 
 
Attribute Option 1 
Option 
2 
Minimum required  
driving hours per week 
40 
hours 
20 
hours 
Health insurance 
The ride-sharing company provides your 
health insurance with average coverage. 
Yes Yes 
Retirement 
The ride-sharing company matches all or 
some of your retirement plan. 
Yes Yes 
Minimum wage guarantee 
The company covers the difference between 
your hourly earning and minimum wage if your 
acceptance rate is higher than 80%. 
Yes No 
Passenger rating system 
You can evaluate a passenger after providing 
a ride. 
No No 
Substitute phone numbers 
Your phone number is disclosed when you 
communicate with passengers 
No No 
Auto insurance deductible 
The company offers an insurance policy with a 
$1,000 or $2,500 deductible and a $1 million 
of a total coverage for ride-sharing 
$1000 $2500 
                c I would drive with Option 1 
c I would drive with Option 2 
c I would not drive with either option  
Figure 2. Example of a choice set 
 
3.1. Flexibility features 
 
Our first hypothesis addresses the relationship 
between the level of flexibility and the intention to 
work. A requirement imposed by the platform owner to 
work for a minimum number of hours within a 
specified period reduces flexibility for suppliers. 
Suppliers may be willing to accept the arrangement if 
platform owners offer better benefits in exchange. 
However, without such an offset, the requirement will 
likely reduce the willingness to work for platform. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1. Requiring minimum work hours is negatively 
associated with suppliers’ willingness to work. 
 
3.2. Employment security features 
 
The second set of hypotheses explores whether 
offering contractual attributes that improve 
employment security can increase a supplier’s 
willingness to join the platform. Whether drivers earn 
the minimum wage while working for ridesharing 
platforms is controversial. It has stimulated persistent 
debates and collective actions by drivers. Prior 
research [50] reports that 74% of drivers make less 
than the minimum wage in certain U.S. states. Given 
these concerns, a guaranteed minimum wage may 
increase the willingness of drivers to work.  
H2a. Guaranteeing a minimum wage is positively 
associated with suppliers’ willingness to work. 
We also examine the effect of offering a health 
insurance or retirement plan, sponsored by the 
ridesharing company. Such plans are not currently 
offered by most ridesharing platforms [37]. Previous 
research finds that health insurance and retirement 
plans increase job satisfaction [1, 3]. Thus, offering 
health insurance and a retirement plan with matching 
contributions by the ridesharing company may increase 
drivers’ willingness to work.  
H2b. Offering a health insurance sponsored by the 
ridesharing company is positively associated with 
suppliers’ willingness to work.  
H2c. Offering a retirement plan with matching 
contribution by the ridesharing company is positively 
associated with suppliers’ willingness to work. 
Another security feature of ridesharing is the auto 
insurance deductible. For example, to reduce driver 
liability, Uber and Lyft currently provide an auto 
insurance policy with a $1-million coverage amount 
and a $1,000 or $2,500 deductible, respectively, when 
drivers’ ridesharing app is active. A lower deductible 
may increase suppliers’ willingness to work.  
H2d. Offering auto insurance with a lower 
deductible is positively associated with suppliers’ 
willingness to work. 
 
3.3. Information features 
 
Information transparency features can increase 
participation in electronic markets [20]. The third set of 
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hypotheses explores how information features of a P2P 
platform influence supplier participation. Some 
ridesharing platforms provide a passenger rating 
system and substitute phone numbers. A passenger 
rating system allows suppliers to evaluate an individual 
passenger, which contributes to a safer work 
environment in the long run. A substitute phone 
number function shows a dummy number to drivers 
and passengers when they communicate with each 
other. This feature helps both parties protect their 
personal information and privacy. Consequently, other 
things being equal, these information features are 
expected to increase willingness to work. 
H3a. Providing a passenger rating system on the 
ridesharing service platform is positively associated 
with suppliers’ willingness to work. 
H3b. Providing a substitute phone number to 
protect personal information is positively associated 
with suppliers’ willingness to work. 
 
3.4. Flexibility and security of alternative jobs 
 
Finally, we explore the relationships between 
characteristics of alternate jobs and the willingness to 
work for ridesharing platforms. Many ridesharing 
suppliers have other primary jobs, and the extent to 
which they are willing to engage with the platform may 
be affected by the flexibility and security of their other 
job.  
We conjecture that when drivers have a primary job 
other than ridesharing, their interest in offering 
ridesharing services may be contingent on the 
flexibility of their primary job. For example, a more 
flexible work schedule may make it easier to find the 
time to offer ridesharing services. However, if the 
flexibility of drivers’ primary job is high, due to their 
preference for flexibility, they may want to keep 
working in their primary job and work less for a 
ridesharing service.  
Another interesting empirical question is whether 
the perceived security of the main job influences the 
willingness to take on a ridesharing job. Applying 
insights from security-potential and aspiration theory 
[26], we expect that security-enhancing service 
attributes will not increase the utility for a supplier if 
that individual perceives the security of the alternative 
main job to be sufficiently high. On the other hand, if 
the alternative main job does not fulfill a minimum 
level of security, the preference for a security-related 
attribute of the ridesharing service will be higher. 
Given the countervailing arguments, we propose a 
negative association to be tested:  
H4a. The perceived flexibility level of an 
alternative job is negatively associated with suppliers’ 
willingness to work for the ridesharing service.  
H4b. The perceived security level of an alternative 
job is negatively associated with suppliers’ willingness 
to work for the ridesharing service. 
 
4. Data and research design 
 
4.1. Data  
 
We obtained online experimental data from 
ridesharing suppliers in the United States using 
Qualtrics online panels during April-May 2018. To 
compare differences between active and inactive 
drivers,2 samples of similar size for each group were 
recruited (204 active and 202 inactive drivers). Each 
sample is sufficiently larger than the required size 
using standard sampling size requirements [25, 34]. 
The unit cost per completed response was $15. 
Among 6,107 people who attempted to participate 
in the experiment, 133 participants were not able to 
proceed since they lived outside the United States. 
3,933 people were screened out because they had not 
worked for ridesharing services. 681 inactive drivers 
were also screened out because the reasons they quit 
offering ridesharing services were not related to the 
work conditions. 489 people did not pass an attention 
check, and another 485 people did not complete the 
survey. The total number of data points obtained from 
the 406 participants is 7,308 (406 participants × 6 
choice sets × 3 options). 
The mean age in the final sample is 36 years old, 
and 54% are male. The proportion of individuals 
holding undergraduate or graduate degrees is 47%, 
which is higher than that of the U.S. population in 
2017, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. 87% of 
participants have driven for Uber and 52% for Lyft. On 
average, they have driven 33.4 hours per week for 1.4 
years. The average wage for ridesharing was $20.08 
per hour. 37% of participants have an alternative 
primary job(s) other than ridesharing. Overall, active 
and inactive drivers have similar socio-demographic 
characteristics. Active drivers generally show shorter 
ridesharing experiences, shorter weekly driving hours, 
and lower hourly wage than inactive drivers. Thus, 
although the inactive drivers no longer drive, their 
level of engagement with ridesharing was slightly 
higher than that of current active drivers in the sample.  
 
4.2. Method and dependent variables  
 
To examine the effect of hypothetical work 
                                                
2 Following Hall and Krueger [21], inactive drivers are defined as 
drivers who have provided ridesharing services before but have not 
done so for the most recent six or more months. 
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conditions on willingness to work, which is not 
observable, a discrete choice experiment was designed 
[46]. The key working conditions included in the 
choice experiment are five contractual attributes 
(minimum required driving hours per week, minimum 
wage guarantee, company-sponsored health insurance, 
company-sponsored retirement plan, and auto 
insurance with different deductible levels), and two 
information features (passenger rating system and 
substitute phone number function). 
There are three levels of minimum required weekly 
driving hours (0, 20, and 40 hours), two levels of the 
other six attributes, and two options composed of these 
seven attributes in each choice set. A full factorial 
experimental design would require (3×2×2×2×2×2×2)2 
=36,864 choice sets for combinations of the seven 
attributes, with multiple levels of each attribute and 
two choice options. To keep the number manageable, 
this study uses a fractional factorial design with six 
choice scenarios through D-optimal design and the 
OPTEX procedure. 
To present participants with choice sets containing 
more varied options, we generated four different 
blocks which contain six choice sets. Each respondent 
was randomly assigned to one of the four blocks. Six 
choice sets were given in random order to avoid 
choices being affected by the order of the choice sets. 
The respondent first chooses Option 1, 2, or neither 
(see Figure 2). If Option 1 or 2 is selected, the 
respondent can decide to increase, decrease, or not 
change driving hours and future work period. A 
participant can choose not to work under conditions 
described in the two options if the incremental utility 
does not exceed that of the no-work option. 
This choice experiment yields two types of 
responses: discrete and ordered categorical data. The 
dependent variables used to test H1, H2, and H3 are 
discrete (i.e., 1 when an option is chosen and 0 when 
the option is not chosen). The relative importance of 
each work condition compared to the other conditions 
in the choice set is examined by running a random 
parameter logistic (RPL) regression model as follows: 
 !"#$   = !"ℎ"$% + '')"$%   + !"#$               (1) 
 !"#$   is a binary utility variable equal to 1 for the 
chosen option and 0 for unchosen options. This 
equation presents individual i’s utility derived from 
choosing an alternative a among available alternatives 
in a choice set Cit and in choice situation t [27]. ℎ"#$   is 
the minimum required weekly driving hours, and !"#$   
is a vector composed of the other contractual and 
information features of a ridesharing service. !"   and !"   
are assumed to be normally distributed random 
parameters that are driver-specific. 
The second type of responses, used to test H4, is 
ordered categorical data which shows drivers’ 
willingness to change their participation rate, work 
hours, and work duration. For the chosen work option, 
the participant i replies whether her willingness to 
work (Yiat) would decrease (Pr(Yiat=1)), not change 
(Pr(Yiat=2)), or increase (Pr(Yiat=3)). We analyze the 
responses using the following generalized ordinal 
logistic regression model (e.g., [33]): 
 
ln(!"#$'   ) = ln !"#$(&)()!"#$(&)   = "#$%&  + (!"#$%&" + ⋯+ !)#$%&))           (2) 
 
X contains ridesharing attribute variables, 
ridesharing pattern variables (hourly rate, weekly work 
hours, percentage of income from ridesharing), 
employment characteristics (perceived flexibility and 
security of a primary job, whether the participant has a 
health insurance and/or retirement plan) and individual 
characteristics variables (age, gender, educational 
attainment, annual income, annual household income, 
household size, and race). 
  
5. Results 
 
We first test H1, H2, and H3 using the RPL model. 
Results in Table 1 show that all working condition 
attributes included in the choice set influence choices 
in the expected directions. Drivers’ utility decreases 
when the ridesharing platform requires minimum 
driving hours (Hours). Their utility increases when the 
company provides health insurance (Health), matches 
with contributions all or some of drivers’ retirement 
plan (Retirement), guarantees the city’s minimum wage 
(Wage), or offers insurance with a smaller deductible 
(Deductible). A passenger rating system for safer work 
environments (Rating) and a substitute phone number 
for privacy protection (Phone) also increase drivers’ 
utility. We also add an interaction term between Health 
and Deductible to check if the two insurance benefits 
may be perceived as a complement or substitute to 
each other, but the interaction term was not significant. 
The relatively large magnitude of coefficients on 
Health, Wage, and Retirement, compared to 
coefficients of other attributes, suggests these are 
important factors to increase drivers’ willingness to 
work for ridesharing platforms.  
Regarding Phone, active drivers’ utility increases 
when the platform provides dummy phone number to 
passengers, helping drivers avoid unnecessary 
interactions after completing a ride. However, inactive 
drivers are not significantly affected by the availability 
of this function. This implies that while a private 
information protection function may not effectively 
motivate inactive drivers to work, the platform 
providing the private information protection function 
raises active drivers’ willingness to work.  
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Table 1. Parameter estimates from RPL 
Variables All drivers   Active drivers   
Inactive 
drivers 
Hours -0.025 *** -0.033 *** -0.019 ** 
 (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.008)  Health 0.605 *** 0.526 *** 0.616 *** 
 (0.085)  (0.114)  (0.119)  Retirement 0.344 *** 0.269 *** 0.392 *** 
 (0.064)  (0.085)  (0.089)  Wage 0.461 *** 0.459 *** 0.506 *** 
 (0.051)  (0.073)  (0.074)  Deductible 0.145 ** 0.141  0.132  
 (0.068)  (0.092)  (0.105)  Rating 0.22 *** 0.225 *** 0.184 *** 
 (0.046)  (0.064)  (0.067)  Phone 0.179 *** 0.288 *** 0.078  
 (0.051)  (0.083)  (0.071)  Health × 
Deductible 
0.116  0.067  0.215  (0.1)  (0.129)  (0.151)  Opt Out -2.322 *** -2.292 *** -2.33 *** 
  (0.164)  (0.221)  (0.239)  N 406     204    202  
Adj.pseudo R-
squared 0.18    0.18    0.20  
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01; standard errors in 
parentheses; the total number of observations is 7,308 (406 
participants × 6 choice sets × 3 options) 
 
By estimating wi (=!"  /– !"  ) using Equation (1), 
drivers’ preferences for the attributes can be presented 
in the unit of required driving hours for ridesharing, 
which the drivers must relinquish for preferable 
working conditions. Table 2 shows how many required 
hours drivers are willing to work for ridesharing to 
benefit from each attribute as a trade-off. On average, 
drivers are willing to work for ridesharing for 8.1 hours 
to benefit from a platform–sponsored health insurance, 
6.5 hours to have access to a retirement plan, and 9.9 
hours for a minimum wage guarantee. The interaction 
term shows drivers are willing to additionally work for 
11.7 hours to have a health insurance and lower 
deductible at the same time. The willingness to work 
for health insurance, a retirement plan, and a minimum 
wage guarantee is higher for inactive drivers than for 
active drivers, suggesting that inactive drivers demand 
financial security more than active drivers, even 
though they need to sacrifice flexibility.   
To explore the relationship between the flexibility 
and security of a driver’s primary job and the 
willingness to work in a ridesharing job, we ran the 
generalized ordinal logistic regression on drivers who 
have other primary job(s) as employees, also known as 
paid employed. 152 drivers (37.4% of all drivers), of 
which 98 were active and 54 inactive, have another 
primary job when working for ridesharing. The paid 
employed    evaluate   the    perceived   flexibility   and 
Table 2. Willingness to work 
Variable  All drivers   Active drivers Inactive drivers 
Health 8.11 *** 7.53 *** 13.25 *** 
 [4.4,11.8]  [4.6,10.5]  [7.4,19.1] Retirement 6.52 *** 4.57 *** 9.39 *** 
 [4.8,8.2]  [2.4,6.8]  [6.1,12.7] Wage 9.86 *** 6.42 *** 12.07 *** 
 [7.8,11.9]  [3.9,9.0]  [8.0,16.2] Deductible -0.48  -0.08  -0.66  
 [-3.3,2.4]  [-2.3,2.1]  [-5.3,4.0] Rating 7.02 *** 3.37 *** 7.69 *** 
 [5.3,8.8]  [1.4,5.4]  [3.8,11.5] Phone 3.11 *** 3.25 *** 0.71  
 [0.8,5.4]  [1.0,5.5]  [-3.4,4.9] Health × 
Deductible 
11.67 *** 4.95 *** 10.15 *** 
[7.3,16.1]  [1.6,8.3]  [2.9,17.4] N 406    204    202  
Adj.pseudo 
R-squared 0.16  0.18  0.20  
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01; [95% confidence 
interval]; Note that the purpose of comparing active and 
inactive drivers resides in recognizing differences in patterns 
of each group’s preferences not in testing whether the 
difference in two groups’ preferences is statistically significant.   
 
security of their primary job using a scale of 1 to 4 
following prior studies [33].3  
Table 3 shows active and inactive drivers’ 
willingness to increase or decrease their work hours. 
Overall, the probability of increasing or decreasing 
active drivers’ anticipated working hours for 
ridesharing4 is not significantly affected by perceived 
flexibility nor by security of their primary job. 
However, for inactive drivers the probability of 
increasing their willingness to work is negatively 
associated with flexibility and security of their primary 
job. 5  This suggests that offering diversified work 
conditions in the sharing economy may complement a 
supplier’s low flexibility or security from their current 
primary job. 
                                                
3 Perceived flexibility of the alternative job is evaluated using the 
question “How likely or unlikely do you think it is that you are able 
to choose when, where, and for how long you work for your current 
primary job?” based on the definition of job flexibility [23]. 
Following the previous literature [33] perceived security of the 
alternative job is evaluated using the question “How likely or 
unlikely do you think it is that you might lose your current primary 
job for some reasons over the next twelve months?” and participants 
reply to these questions by choosing one of the four levels of 
likelihood: “Not at all likely,” “Not very likely,” “Quite likely,” or 
“Very likely” [33]. 
4  For active drivers’ anticipated participation rate and working 
period, the patterns of statistical significance on coefficients are 
consistent with the result of working hours. 
5  The coefficient of -10.4 is interpreted that the probability of 
increasing inactive drivers’ willingness to work for ridesharing 
decreases by 10.4% as the level of perceived flexibility increases by 
one.   
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 Table 3. Generalized ordered logit estimation: 
Paid employed 
Variables 
Working hours for ride-sharing 
Active drivers   Inactive drivers 
Pr(Decrease)  Pr(Increase)   Pr(Increase) 
Marginal 
effects 
(%) 
z   
Marginal 
effects 
(%) 
z   
Marginal 
effects 
(%) 
z 
Ridesharing attributes           Hours 0.8 *** 5.4  -0.1  -0.6  -0.1  -0.5 
  Health -8.5 *** -4.3  8.2 *** 4.3  8.0 *** 3.2 
  Retirement -3.2 * -1.9  3.1 * 1.9  6.2 *** 3.0 
  Wage -6.8 *** -4.6  6.5 *** 4.6  7.4 *** 4.0 
  Deductible -2.8 * -1.8  2.7  1.8  2.4  1.2 
  Rating -4.7 *** -2.8  1.1  0.7  6.8 *** 3.8 
  Phone -4.9 *** -3.3  4.7 *** 3.3  0.4  -0.2 
Employment characteristics     
  Perceived flexibility -3.4  -1.6  3.2   1.6  -10.4 
* -1.7 
  Perceived security 4.0  0.9  -2.1   -0.9  -13.7 
*** -4.4 
N 676               324 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.16             0.49 
Note: * p < .10, ** p < .05, ***p < .01; Controls: demographic 
characteristics, ridesharing work patterns, other employment 
characteristics; N (676, 324) is the number of responses from 
98 active drivers and 54 inactive drivers, respectively. This 
categorical data is not balanced as participants are asked to 
report the willingness to change their work intention only if they 
choose a work option. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
6.1. Findings and contributions  
 
In the discrete choice experiment, drivers reveal 
their preferences by choosing options in choice sets 
composed of flexibility, security, and information 
features. We find that drivers’ willingness to work for 
ridesharing generally increases when the ridesharing 
company provides a minimum wage guarantee, 
company-sponsored benefit plans, and information 
features that protect drivers, although they may need to 
relinquish flexibility by providing a ridesharing service 
for minimum required working hours. The choice 
experiment results suggest that providing higher 
security in working conditions appeals particularly to 
inactive drivers. More generally, platform companies 
can focus on offering job security to lure inactive 
suppliers back to the platform.  
Regarding information attributes, we find that 
active drivers value features that prevent unwanted 
personal information disclosure more than inactive 
drivers do. We also find a negative association between 
inactive drivers’ willingness to work for ridesharing 
and perceived flexibility and security of their primary 
job. This relationship shows the sharing economy can 
play a role in complementing low flexibility or security 
in working conditions of a supplier’s main job. 
Our findings make three contributions to the 
research literature. First, this study extends existing 
research by providing empirical evidence for platform 
managers to identify which work conditions are 
important to increase suppliers’ utility, which can 
increase the supply of services in their platform. Prior 
studies have mainly focused on the platform’s owner-
developer relationship or the platform’s owner-
consumer relationship. This study underscores the 
importance of contracts between platform owners and 
suppliers, viewing suppliers as active main players and 
decision makers, rather than as passive players who 
accept any work conditions. Second, this study adds to 
the literature on information transparency. While 
previous studies have primarily focused on B2B or 
B2C markets, we investigate the effect of information 
features which contribute to establishing trust in P2P 
transactions on suppliers’ willingness to partner with a 
platform. Third, this study contributes to the literature 
on a recent perspective in labor economics asserting a 
positive relationship between flexibility and security 
(referred to as “flexicurity”). This approach has gained 
traction in many countries as a possible response to the 
new work conditions in the digital economy. Finally, 
as far as we know, this is the first study to provide 
empirical evidence on the potential complementarities 
between the security of sharing economy suppliers’ 
main job and a sharing economy job with company-
sponsored benefit plans.  
This study also offers practical implications that go 
beyond ridesharing services. It helps design supplier 
attraction and retainment strategies for companies that 
might face conflicts related to suppliers’ working 
conditions and concerns about the fairness of the 
distribution of benefits from sharing economy services. 
Granting the option to choose benefits and better 
working conditions to suppliers can improve service 
quantity and quality, enhance corporate image, 
improve customer service, and ultimately lead to 
higher profits.  
Regulators and authorities should consider that a 
large share of individuals (63% of participants in our 
study) work for ridesharing as a primary means of 
living. Considering that offering a minimum wage is 
still one of the most important and controversial issues 
for ridesharing platforms [50], policy makers could 
introduce measures that require platforms to notify 
suppliers whether they will earn the minimum wage or 
not, and provide incentives for platform companies to 
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improve their benefit plans. Moreover, considering 
inactive drivers’ low concerns or lack of awareness 
about the risk of personal information disclosure, 
regulators should take more care of and monitor 
potential related issues to prevent misuse of personal 
information.  
 
6.2. Directions for future research 
 
This study only touches the surface of trade-offs in 
working conditions for suppliers in the sharing 
economy. We can think of two possible interesting 
directions for future research. First, a longitudinal 
study to observe actual supply decisions can 
complement this study, since we could not capture 
them in our cross-sectional design. Moreover, the 
cross-sectional nature of the data makes it difficult to 
establish reasonable conclusions on causality. Thus, 
studies that capture dynamics between drivers’ 
decision to work and working conditions will provide 
valuable insights. 
Another avenue for future research is to study 
additional working conditions that this study did not 
capture. To minimize confusion across participants, 
our experiment setting only contains core descriptions 
of the choice experiment, avoiding much detailed 
explanation of each work condition. For example, 
drivers’ expectation of a standard health insurance 
coverage may differ. Future studies may investigate 
drivers’ work decision under more differentiated 
benefit plan conditions.  
In sum, this study increases our understanding of 
the factors that motivate suppliers to join a platform 
and increase their willingness to work. More generally, 
there are tangible implications for platform design and 
governance related to the trade-offs between offering 
flexibility and security to suppliers in the sharing 
economy. 
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